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We analyze an entry game with multiple periods. In each period pri-
vately informed agents who have not yet joined decide whether to sub-
scribe to a network. Subscribers derive beneﬁts in future periods de-
pending on the network size. We study the case where agents are suf-
ﬁciently patient and show that there exists a unique symmetric equi-
librium if the number of existing subscribers is common knowledge in
each period. This resolves the coordination problem which is prevalent
in markets with network externalities. (JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D82,
D85)




Adoption/network externalities arise when complementarities exist across agents in
the consumption of certain goods or services. Examples include commodities designed
for joint consumption or sharing (telephony and data networks), those with indirect scale
economies for complementary goods (hardware-software and durable-good servicing), and
adoption of innovations and standards where compatibility is valuable.
Due to complementarity, there typically exist multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria in
such markets. The worst is a null equilibrium in which no one adopts because no one is ever
anticipated to adopt, while at the other end is a “maximum” equilibrium. The maximum
equilibrium refers to a “maximal set of agents” who would indeed adopt when that is
what everyone expects to occur. There may be other equilibria intermediate between
these two. With no outside force present, the particular equilibrium to be realized is
indeterminate. This is a well-known coordination problem. One strand of research has
studied inducement schemes as a device to overcome the likelihood of coordination failure
in the static, simultaneous move entry game. These schemes provide insurance against low
adoption or entry rates. Such insurance warrants a suﬃcient rate of adoption by those
who have a low cost of entry, which, in turn, will induce others with higher entry costs
to also enter. Dybvig and Spatt (1983) and Park (2003) devise insurance schemes that
will induce certain target equilibria as the unique (symmetric) equilibrium at the minimal
expected cost of insurance subsidy. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) study a refund mechanism
to induce private contribution to a public project where a suﬃcient number of people must
contribute before the project produces any beneﬁt.
If agents’ types are randomly determined and privately known, but there is common
knowledge both that the types are correlated and of the nature of the correlation, then
the theory of global games developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) would apply.
Morris and Shin (2003) show that even when there is only a small amount of heterogeneity
in types in such games there will often be a unique equilibrium. The common knowledge
of the way in which beliefs are correlated allows individuals through a process of backward
induction to condition their beliefs as to how others will act on the knowledge of their own
individual types.
In this paper we analyze the eﬀect of a dynamic adoption process on resolving the
coordination problem in the market entry game when agent types are privately and inde-
pendently drawn from a commonly known distribution. The independent nature of types
1renders the logic of global games inapplicable. A dynamic adoption process, however,
introduces a strategic consideration that is absent in the static game. Individuals who
chose to enter early may inﬂuence the entry decisions of others who have not yet entered.
This creates the possibility that early entrants may launch a domino chain reaction of
widespread adoption. However, agents considering early entry will be so motivated only if
they expect such a domino chain. Such a domino chain itself relies on a nested sequence
of optimistic beliefs of future adopters. At ﬁrst sight, therefore, it appears that the basic
intuition of coordination failure due to multiplicity of self-conﬁrming expectation would
continue to prevail in dynamic adoption process. Rather surprisingly, we establish that
this is not the case. Speciﬁcally, we show that there exists a unique symmetric, perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if agents decide when as well as whether to adopt and they are
suﬃciently patient. In this equilibrium entry occurs with positive probability.
In our model, agent’s types are ordered by the utility level the agent derives from
being a member of the network. Since each member’s utility increases as the network gets
larger, the higher is the utility an agent derives from the network the lower is the threshold
network size for this agent to join proﬁtably. Hence, we describe an agent who derives a
higher utility level from the network as having a lower type. In equilibrium, all agents
choose a cutoﬀ strategy in which an agent enters in any period k precisely when his type is
no higher than a cutoﬀ level for that period. In this equilibrium some entry always occurs
with a positive probability. Intuitively, higher types who would need large numbers of other
agents also to be in the network in order to ﬁnd their own entry proﬁtable, will enter later
than lower types who would need smaller numbers of other agents in the network to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable. Therefore, an agent of a particular type who has not yet entered can use the
common knowledge of the state of the game in period k to determine the expected number
of additional entrants conditional on his own entry in period k and the number of prior
entrants. The ability to form these expectations of future entrants generates a backward
induction process that uniquely pins down the equilibrium adoption process from the point
where all but one agent have entered already all the way back to the point at which no
one has entered.
When agents do not discount, equilibrium cutoﬀ level in each period is determined
entirely by the number of agents who have entered by then. However, when agents do
discount, the equilibrium cutoﬀ levels depend on further details of history such as how
many entered in which period. Nevertheless, the basic logic of our argument applies
and we show that when agents are suﬃciently patient, there exists a unique, symmetric
2equilibrium. This equilibrium converges to the no-discount equilibrium as the discount
factor tends to one.
Since the agents are ex ante identical we ﬁnd it natural that they follow symmet-
ric strategies in equilibrium. Hence, we primarily focus on symmetric equilibrium in this
paper. Asymmetric equilibria, however, may exist in some environments. Nevertheless,
such asymmetric equilibria converge to the unique symmetric equilibrium as the number
of agents increases without bound, because “the expected behavior of all other agents” to
which each agent best-responds diﬀers only by the behavior of one agent from the perspec-
tives of any two agents. Therefore, their respective expectations become arbitrarily close to
one another as the number of agents increases. In this sense, the existence of asymmetric
equilibria does not undermine our main message that dynamic adoption process resolves
the coordination failure.
The coordination problem arising from strategic complementarities has been studied
in some other dynamic settings. Rohlfs (1974) considers introductory pricing in his classic
paper on telecommunication markets. As mentioned earlier Bagnoli and Lipman (1989)
study a refund mechanism in a dynamic setting. Andreoni (1998) examines large “leader-
ship gifts” in charitable fund-raising.1 These papers analyze environments with (almost)
complete information, i.e., either the agents’ preferences or their distribution are/is known.
Dixit (2003) also obtains unique equilibrium in a dynamic game similar to ours, but his
model is one of complete information. Our paper diﬀers from these studies in that we
examine an incomplete information environment. Farrell and Saloner (1985) deal with
incomplete information and contain an analysis close to ours when there are two agents.
Our analysis generalizes theirs to any ﬁnite number of agents and to the cases that they
derive utility each period so that the dynamics, as well as the ﬁnal network formed, are of
1 Organizers of charitable fund drives typically announce at various stages of the drive how much
money has been pledged, and possibly the number of individuals who have made donations. According
to the logic of our analysis, the fact that these announcement will be made should have an eﬀect on how
much will be given in the early stages of a campaign because those who go early have reason to believe
that their gifts may encourage others to give at later stages. This is because those who choose not to give
early, upon seeing how much has been given, will have a greater degree of conﬁdence that the beneﬁts that
they will derive from the completion of the campaign will more than cover the cost to them of their own
donation. Of course, fundraisers often select a group of ‘leaders’ whom they solicit ﬁrst, prior to announcing
a general campaign. This phenomenon may be more closely related to costly transmission of information
regarding the ‘quality’ of the charitable endeavor and informational cascades, a logic quite separate from
that underlying our own model. Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2004) discuss how leadership grants
may transmit information and how the possibility of this transmittal may aﬀect both the amount raised in
the ‘leadership’ or ‘quiet’ phase of a fundraising drive and the total amount raised. Marx and Matthews
(2000) argue that dynamic contribution tends to enhance eﬃciency when the cumulative total contribution
is publicly known, in a setting of voluntary contribution to a public project.
3importance.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. The next section describes
the model. Section 3 presents the main analysis that characterizes the unique symmetric
equilibrium. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks.
2. Model
There are N+1 ex ante identical agents, indexed by i 2 I = f1;;N+1g, who are
privately informed of their own types t  0 which are independent draws from a common
distribution function F : <+ ! [0;1]. Let f : <+ ! <+ denote the corresponding density
function. We assume that F is continuous and F(0) = 0 (i.e., t is atomless) and f is
bounded. For expositional convenience only, we assume F(t)<1 and f(t)>0 for all t  0.
There are inﬁnite periods indexed by k = 1;. At the beginning of each period k the
number nk1 of agents who adopted/subscribed up until period k1 is common knowledge;
Based on the public history hk:=(n1;;nk1) the agents who have not adopted already
simultaneously choose either to adopt the network product or not. Once adopted, agents
cannot reverse their choices in future periods.
An agent who adopts in period k0 derives a stage utility from the network product in
every period k  k0, determined by his type t and the network size in period k measured
by the number k := nk  1 of other adopters (i.e., not counting himself): A t-type agent
derives a utility of ut(k) 2 < in period k.2 The stage utility to a non-adopter is normalized
to u = 0. Each agent’s objective is to maximize the expected -discounted average of






if  < 1, where uk is the utility in period k, which is 0 if the agent has not adopted yet
and is ut(k) if the agent of type t has adopted; and maximizes the limit of the expected
value of (1) as  ! 1 if the discount factor is  = 1.
An agent’s type, t, measures how reluctant he is to join the network, so a higher
type means a more conservative agent who needs a larger network to beneﬁt by joining.
2 After development of this paper, we became aware of Xue (2003). Xue studies a dynamic version
of the stag hunt game. His model has special features that are not present in our own model, namely, the
beneﬁt from network does not realize unless everybody adopts and the type enters in the utility function
linearly. His result and analysis for no discounting case are similar to ours, however there are some steps
(e.g., Lemmas 3 and 4) that we found necessary to prove our result but are not used in his proof. This
may reﬂect nontrivial diﬀerences between the two models.
4Hence, we assume that ut() is strictly increasing in  = 0;;N, strictly decreasing and
continuous in t, and that
u0(0) = 0 and 9¯ t s:t: u¯ t(N) = 0: (2)
The ﬁrst equality says that the “best” type is indiﬀerent between being a sole member of
the network and being a non-member.3 Clearly, ¯ t > 0 deﬁned above is unique because
ut(N) strictly decreases in t and u0(N) > u0(0) = 0. We denote this game by Γ.
An agent i’s period-k strategy when he has not adopted yet, given a history hk =
(n1;;nk1), is an integrable function that maps types to adoption probabilities, i.e.,
ai(jhk) : <+ ! [0;1]
where ai(tjhk) is the probability that the agent i adopts (the network product) when his
type is t, if he has not adopted up to the previous period. A function ai(jhk) is a cutoﬀ
strategy at (a cutoﬀ level) ˆ t  0, if ai(tjhk) = 1 for all t < ˆ t and ai(tjhk) = 0 for all t > ˆ t.
An agent i’s strategy is a collection fai(jhk)g for all possible hk, which we denote by ai
as shorthand. A strategy ai is a cutoﬀ strategy if ai(jhk) is a cutoﬀ strategy for every
possible hk.
A strategy proﬁle (ai)i2I is a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of Γ if each agent i’s
period-k strategy after each possible hk is a best response to (aj)j6=i conditional on hk.
3. Unique Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section we focus our attention on symmetric equilibrium and show that there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of Γ when  is suﬃciently large. First, we construct
it for  = 1 and show that it is a cutoﬀ equilibrium and the cutoﬀ level in each period
depends only on the total number of agents who already adopted. Then, we show (details
in the Appendix) that there exists a threshold  < 1 such that the same argument can be
extended to all  >  to establish that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium and it is
a cutoﬀ equilibrium, however, the cutoﬀ level in each period depends on the full adoption
history up to then.
From now until Theorem 1, we analyze the case that  = 1. Since there are ﬁnite
agents the adoption process stops within ﬁnite periods, so that any utility stream fukg that
an agent might expect has a constant utility level after a ﬁnite number of periods. Hence,
the limit of (1) as  ! 1 for any utility stream is this constant utility level. Consequently,
3 All the main results of this paper hold when u0(0) is negative and suﬃciently small and u0(1) > 0.
5the agent’s objective amounts to maximizing the “terminal” stage utility level that will
prevail after the adoption process has stopped.
The observation that agents only care about the ﬁnal network size of any adoption
process simpliﬁes the analysis for the case  = 1 because the details of the adoption process
leading to the ﬁnal network can be ignored. However, it allows an inessential indiﬀerence of
an agent between adopting now and adopting later so long as the ﬁnal network will be the
same. For example, if all but one agent already adopted the remaining agent is indiﬀerent
between adopting now and adopting in any later period. To circumvent this problem in
this paper we adopt a stopping rule that if no one adopted the network in some period
k, then no further adoption is allowed and only those agents who adopted by then beneﬁt
from the network in future periods.4 Below we characterize the symmetric equilibrium for
the case  = 1. Note that ai = aj in symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 1: If  = 1, in any symmetric equilibrium every agent adopts with a positive
probability in period 1.
Proof: Consider a symmetric strategy proﬁle (ai)i2I such that
R
ai(jh1)dF = 0. Let
t1 be the unique type such that ut1(1) = 0. Consider an -type agent in period 1 where
 < t1 so that u(1) > 0. If this agent deviates by adopting in period 1, then in the next
period other agents would adopt with a positive probability, say p > 0, because adopting is
beneﬁcial when their types are lower than t1. The expected utility from such a deviation,
therefore, exceeds pu(1) + (1  p)u(0) which tends to pu0(1) > 0 as  ! 0, so that such
deviation is beneﬁcial for suﬃciently small . Hence, the considered strategy proﬁle cannot
be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
By Lemma 1 in every symmetric equilibrium there is a positive probability that
the game reaches a period with any number of existing adopters, i.e., with a history
hk = (n1;;nk1) for any nk1 = 0;;N. As will become clear in the analysis, what
matters in the strategic decisions in the remaining part of the game is the total number
nk1 of adopters by then (equivalently, the number of agents who have not adopted),
not how it evolved. So, we deﬁne the state (variable) s for a period k with a history
4 The eﬀect of this stopping rule is to shorten the completion time of the network to be formed by
speeding up the adoption process. This is entirely immaterial when  = 1. For  < 1, an equilibrium under
this stopping rule remains an equilibrium under a more general, -stopping rule for any natural number :
the process stops if no one adopted for  consecutive periods. There may exist additional equilibria under
-stopping rule if  > 1, but the ﬁnal network to emerge in these equilibria converge, as  ! 1, to that in
the unique equilibrium under the 1-stopping rule. (A proof is available from authors.) In this sense, the
main results of this paper are robust to the stopping rule we adopt.
6hk = (n1;;nk1) as s = N + 1  nk1, i.e., the number of non-adopters after hk, who
we refer to as the “remaining” agents. With a slight abuse of notation, we write ai(js) if
a strategy ai has the property that ai(jhk) = ai(jh0
k0) whenever both hk and h0
k0 have the
same state s. We now proceed with an induction argument that characterizes symmetric
equilibrium (ai)i2I when  = 1.
STEP 1: As shown above, the game reaches any possible state s = 0;;N + 1, with a
strictly positive probability. The game ends if it reaches s = 0. Suppose that the game
reached a state s = 1, i.e., only one agent remains in some period k. It is trivial that this
last agent will adopt precisely when his type does not exceed ¯ t deﬁned in (2). That is, the
equilibrium strategy of the remaining agent when he is the only remaining agent (i.e., in
state s = 1) is a cutoﬀ strategy at 1  ¯ t:
ai(tj1) =

1 if t < 1
0 if t > 1
(3)
STEP 2: Suppose that the game reached a state s = 2 in period k with a history hk.
Consider one remaining agent, say i, of type ti  1. If the other remaining agent, say
j, were to adopt in this period, agent i would get a utility of uti(N) by adopting in this
period; if agent i waited in this period he would adopt in the next period (because ti  1),
hence again get a utility of uti(N) eventually. Therefore, agent i’s optimal decision in this
period depends on what would happen in the contingency that agent j were to not adopt
in this period. In this contingency, agent i would get a utility u = 0 by not adopting
in this period because no further adoption would ensue due to the postulated stopping
rule; if agent i adopted in this period, he would get uti(N) eventually in case agent j
joins next period and uti(N  1) otherwise. Since agent j’s response in the next period is
independent of ti, the expected utility of agent i from adopting decreases in ti, whereas
that from waiting is 0. Consequently, agent i (and j by symmetry) should employ a cutoﬀ
strategy at a level, say ˆ t. Note that agent i strictly prefers waiting in this period if his
type is suﬃciently close to 1, hence ˆ t < 1.
Let g(jhk) denote the posterior density function updated from f by hk on the type of
the remaining agent. Then, the condition that characterizes ˆ t is the following: agent i of
ˆ t-type is indiﬀerent between adopting and waiting in this period given that agent j follows




g(tjhk)dt + uˆ t(N  1)
Z 1
1
g(tjhk)dt = 0: (4)
7The left hand side, LHS, of (4) is the expected utility of a ˆ t-type agent when he adopts in
the current period conditional on the other remaining agent waits, while the RHS is that
when he waits in the current period. Note that the LHS of (4) is strictly decreasing in ˆ t,
clearly from a positive value when ˆ t = 0 to a negative value when ˆ t = 1. Hence, there
exists a unique value of ˆ t that solves (4), which is the equilibrium cutoﬀ level in the period
following the history hk, denoted by 2(hk). Summarizing,
Lemma 2: If  = 1, the equilibrium strategy in state s = 2 with a history hk is a
cutoﬀ strategy at 2(hk), the unique level of ˆ t that solves (4).
STEP 3: Fix a state ˜ s and any possible history ˜ h whose state is ˜ s. (A history h0
k0 is an
extension of a history hk if k0  k and the ﬁrst k components of h0
k0 coincide with hk.)
Consider the following property in an equilibrium:
[A] The strategy after any extension h of ˜ h whose state is s < ˜ s, is a cutoﬀ strategy at a
level that only depends on the state, denoted by s(˜ h), and decreases in s (conditional
of ˜ h).
Note that this property holds along an equilibrium when ˜ s = 3 by Lemma 2, and trivially
if ˜ s < 3. (For ˜ s = 3, note that, given the equilibrium strategy after ˜ h, the posterior
g(jh0) is uniquely determined for h0 that extends ˜ h and has a state 2.) We now make an
induction hypothesis that the property [A] holds for all ˜ s  r where r = 3;;N, along
an equilibrium. Below we establish that under this hypothesis the property [A] holds for
˜ s = r+1 as well. In short, we try to show that any extension of ˜ h entails a cutoﬀ strategy
that only depends on the state, with the cutoﬀ level strictly decreasing in the state.
Lemma 3: Suppose  = 1. Pick an arbitrary remaining agent i after the game reached
a state ˜ s in period k with a history ˜ h, such that [A] holds. Consider the contingency that
m > 0 of the other ˜ s  1 remaining agents were to adopt in period k according to the
equilibrium strategy ai(j˜ h). Then, the ﬁnal network size that would realize when the
agent i adopts in this period is the same as that that would realize when he adopts in the
next period.
Proof: Consider the case that the agent i adopted in period k, so that the state in
period k + 1 is s1 = ˜ s  m  1 < ˜ s, hence all remaining agents of types lower than the
equilibrium cutoﬀ level s1 would adopt in period k + 1 by [A]. (We use s as shorthand
for s(˜ h) for s < ˜ s in this proof.) Let s2 be the state of period k+2 that arises as a result.
If s2 = s1 then no further adoption comes forth by [A], in which case s2 is called the
8terminal state; otherwise, i.e., if s2 < s1 then all remaining agents of types lower than the
equilibrium cutoﬀ level s2 would adopt in period k + 2, resulting in a state s3 of period
k + 3. If s3 = s2 then s3 is the terminal state; otherwise, the state keeps being updated
analogously for subsequent periods. The updating should stop because there are ﬁnite
states. Denoting the terminal state by sx, we have a sequence of states s1 > s2 >  > sx
and associated cutoﬀ levels s1 < s2 <  < sx for periods k + 1;;k + x, respectively.
Note sx1 = sx by construction.
Consider the alternative case that the agent i did not adopt in period k, so that the
state in period k + 1 is s0
1 = r  m = s1 + 1, hence all remaining agents of types lower
than the equilibrium cutoﬀ level s0
1 would adopt in period k + 1. Let s0
2 be the state of
period k + 2 that arises as a result. If s0
2 = s0
1 then no further adoption comes forth by
[A], hence s0
2 is the terminal state; otherwise, i.e., if s0
2 < s0
1 then all remaining agents of
types lower than the equilibrium cutoﬀ level s0
2 would adopt in period k + 2, resulting in
a state s0
3 of period k + 3. If s0
3 = s0
2 then s0
3 is the terminal state; otherwise, the state
keeps being updated analogously. Denoting the terminal state by s0
y, we have a sequence
of states s0
1 > s0
2 >  > s0
y and associated cutoﬀ levels s0
1 < s0
2 <  < s0
y for periods
k + 1;;k + y, respectively. Again, s0
y1 = s0
y by construction.
The claim of the Lemma is proved if sx = s0
y. In fact, it is easy to see that
[B] sx = s0
y ensues if sj = s0
` for some 1  j  x and 1  `  y, because then sj+1 = s0
`+1
and the subsequent updating of the state is the same between the two sequences.
Note s0
1 > s0
2 because the agent i adopts in period k + 1. Since s1 = s0
1  1 by
construction as noted earlier, s1  s0
2. If s1 = s0
2 then the claim is proved by [B].
Suppose otherwise, i.e., s1 > s0





where #(0;] is the number of agents other than i who remain after period k+1 and have
types in (0;]. Similarly, s2 = s1  #(0;s1] by construction. Since s0
1 > s1 implies
s0
1 < s1, it follows that #(0;s0
1]  #(0;s1], hence s0
2  s2.
The claim follows by [B] if s0
2 = s2, hence suppose s0
2 > s2 in the sequel. By construc-
tion, s0
3 = s0
1  1  #(0;s0
2] = s1  #(0;s0
2]. Since s1 > s0
2 it follows that s2  s0
3. Since
the claim follows if s2 = s0
3, suppose s2 > s0
3 in the sequel.
Proceeding analogously, we deduce that sx = s0
y unless s0
j > sj > s0
j+1 > sj+1 for all
j = 1;2;. However, these inequalities contradict sx1 = sx, an equality that must hold
by construction, hence we conclude that sx = s0
y, i.e., the ﬁnal network sizes are the same.
Q.E.D.
9Lemma 4: Suppose  = 1 and that along the equilibrium path a state ˜ s is reached
in period k with a history ˜ h such that [A] holds. The equilibrium strategy in period k is a
cutoﬀ strategy whose cutoﬀ level is uniquely determined by ˜ h and is lower than the cutoﬀ
level for the state ˜ s  1.
Proof: Let g(j˜ h) and G(j˜ h) denote the posterior density and cdf functions, respec-
tively, updated by ˜ h on the type of each remaining agent. In light of [A], let s(˜ h) denote
the equilibrium cutoﬀ level after the history ˜ hs = (˜ h;s) for s < ˜ s.
Consider an arbitrary remaining agent i in period k. Suppose his type is ti  ˜ s1(˜ h).
If he waited while m > 0 other agents adopted in this period, by adopting in the next period
he can induce the same ﬁnal network size as when he adopted in this period, according
to Lemma 3—In fact, he will indeed adopt in the next period because ti  ˜ s1(˜ h) <
˜ sm(˜ h). Hence, adopting and waiting is equivalent in this contingency and, therefore, the
optimal decision of remaining agent in this period is determined by what would happen
in the contingency that no agent other than i would adopt in this period. In this latter
contingency, if the agent i adopted, then his expected utility is
˜ s X
j=1
uti(N  ˜ s + j)Prob(jj˜ h)
where Prob(jj˜ h) is the probability conditional on ˜ h that no other agent adopts in period k
and j more other agents adopt eventually. If the agent i did not adopt, the adoption process
would end and he would get u = 0. Again, since other remaining agents’ behavior does
not depend on ti, the sum above strictly decreases in ti. Hence, the equilibrium strategy
in this period is a cutoﬀ strategy at, say ˆ t. The equilibrium level of ˆ t is characterized by
˜ s X
j=1
uˆ t(N  ˜ s + j)Prob(jj˜ h) = 0 (5)
where Prob(jj˜ h) is calculated using the fact that the posterior density on the type of
remaining agent after this period is g(j˜ h)jtˆ t, the truncated density of g(j˜ h) above ˆ t. As ˆ t
increases, g(j˜ h)jtˆ t deteriorates in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, hence so
does the distribution of total number of future adopters. Together with the fact that utility
decreases in type, we deduce that the LHS of (5) is strictly decreasing in ˆ t, hence there is
a unique value of ˆ t that solves (5), denoted by ˜ s(˜ h). Clearly, ˜ s(˜ h) > 0 because the LHS
of (5) is positive when ˆ t = 0. Consider a ˜ s1(˜ h)-type agent: his expected utility would
10be 0 if he already adopted and ˜ s  2 agents remain whose type is distributed according
to g(j˜ h) truncated at ˜ s1(˜ h). So, his expected utility would be negative if ˜ s  1 agents
remain with the same type distribution. This means that the LHS of (5) is negative at
ˆ t = ˜ s1(˜ h) and, therefore, 0 < ˜ s(˜ h) < ˜ s1(˜ h). Q.E.D.
Recall the induction hypothesis that the property [A] holds for all ˜ s  r where r =
3;;N, along an equilibrium. We now establish that the property [A] holds for ˜ s = r+1
as well. Suppose a state ˜ s = r + 1 is reached in some period k after a history ˜ h. By
induction hypothesis and Lemma 4, the equilibrium strategy after ˜ hr = (˜ h;r) is a cutoﬀ
strategy at a level r(˜ hr) and r(˜ hr) < r1(˜ hr) <  < 1(˜ hr) = ¯ t.
We now show that the history (˜ hr;s) and any other extension ˜ hs of ˜ h with state s
entail the same cutoﬀ strategy for s < r. By induction hypothesis we only need to show
this for ˜ hs that is not an extension of ˜ hr, which we assume below. Let g(j˜ h), g(j˜ hs) and
g(j˜ hr;s) be the posterior densities after ˜ h, ˜ hs and (˜ hr;s), respectively. If s = 1, the cutoﬀ
levels are clearly s(˜ hs) = s(˜ hr) = ¯ t. Now suppose s(˜ hs) = s(˜ hr) for all s = 1;;z 1,
and consider s = z(< r). For the cutoﬀ level z = z(˜ hr), the expected utility of a z-agent
when he ﬁnds himself to be the sole adopter in the current period, say kz, is 0:
z X
j=0
uz(N  z + j)Prob(jj˜ hr;z  1) = 0 (6)
where Prob(jj˜ hr;z 1) is the probability that j more agents adopt eventually when z 1
agents who remain after period kz follow cutoﬀ levels s(˜ hr), s = 1;;z  1, in future
periods. The posterior density of the z  1 remaining agents is g(j˜ hr)jt>z because cutoﬀ
strategies would have been followed in period k + 1 and later.
Next, consider 0
z = z(˜ hz). Similarly as above, the expected utility of a 0
z-agent





z(N  z + j)Prob(jj˜ h;z  1) = 0 (7)
where Prob(jj˜ h;z  1) is the probability that j more agents adopt eventually when z  1
agents who remain after period k0
z follow cutoﬀ levels s(˜ hz), s = 1;;z  1, in future
periods. Note s(˜ hz) = s(˜ hr) for s = 1;;z  1 by supposition and that the pos-
terior density of the z  1 remaining agents in this case is g(j˜ hs)jt>0
z because, again,
cutoﬀ strategies would have been followed in period k + 1 and later. Assume z  0
z so
11that g(j˜ hs)jt>0
z = c  g(j˜ hs)jt>z for some constant c > 0 for all t > z and, therefore,
Prob(jj˜ h;z1) = cz1Prob(jj˜ hr;z1) for all t > z. From (6), therefore, it follows that
(7) holds precisely when 0
z = z. A symmetric argument works when z < 0
z. Hence, we
have proved that s(˜ hs) = s(˜ hr) for all s < r, as desired. This completes the induction
argument that [A] holds for ˜ s = r + 1 as well.
Finally, applying Lemma 4 to histories with state ˜ s = r+1, we prove that the equilib-
rium strategy in state r + 1 and onwards is a cutoﬀ strategy that is uniquely determined
by the posterior on the remaining agents’ type shaped by the history up to then. Applying
the same logic inductively all the way back to the the state N +1, i.e., to the null history,
we ﬁnd a unique symmetric equilibrium. We state this as:
Theorem 1: If  = 1, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of Γ. In this
equilibrium, the remaining agents’ strategy after any history is a cutoﬀ strategy at a level
that depends only on the state s (i.e., the number of remaining agents), denoted by s,
and 0 < N+1 < N <  < 1 = ¯ t.
Part of the analysis up to now relies on the fact  = 1, hence is not readily applicable
to the case  < 1. If  < 1, an agent would prefer adopting earlier rather than later if
adopting later delays the adoption process although it leads to the same network eventually.
In evaluating the beneﬁt of adopting now as opposed to waiting, therefore, the time paths
following adoption by some other agents come into the equation even if the ﬁnal network
will be the same regardless of whether the agent in question adopts now or in the next
period, because the diﬀerences along the two paths now matters. Due to such additional
considerations the future cutoﬀ levels depends not only on how many agents have adopted
by then but also on when they (including the agent in question) adopted. This implies
that the ﬁnal network can be diﬀerent depending on when the agent in question adopts.
So, the Lemma 3 does not hold. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of these complications become
negligible as  approaches 1 because then the discrepancy in argument from the case  = 1
either happens with negligible probability or has a negligible eﬀect because it applies
only to a ﬁnite number of periods before the terminal network is reached. Therefore, the
basic intuition of Theorem 1 extends to large values of : We establish that there is a
unique symmetric equilibrium, and that it is a cutoﬀ equilibrium and converges to the one
described in Theorem 1 as  tends to 1. This result is formally stated in the next theorem
and is proved in the Appendix. Note that it is no longer the case that the equilibrium
cutoﬀ level depends only on the number of total adopters by then, but it depends on the
12full adoption history up to then.
Theorem 2: Suppose i) ˙ ut(), the derivative of ut() with respect to t, exists for all
t 2 (0;¯ t) and  = 0;;N, and ii) there is  > 0 such that j˙ ut()j >  for all t 2 (0;¯ t)
and  = 0;;N. Then, there is  < 1 such that if  >  there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium of Γ. Furthermore, this equilibrium is a cutoﬀ equilibrium and converges to
the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 as  ! 1.
Up to now we have focused on symmetric equilibrium and characterized it fully. We
note, however, that equilibria in asymmetric cutoﬀ strategies may also exist in some envi-
ronments. This is because, given a history up to a certain period, individual agents may
have diﬀerent beliefs regarding the distributions of types of all other remaining agents.
Such diﬀerences in beliefs may support diﬀerences in the anticipated number of other peo-
ple who will enter in the future and, therefore, may result in asymmetric equilibrium cutoﬀ
levels.5 Note, however, that the diﬀerences in beliefs of any pair of agents can only exist
with respect to beliefs about each other’s types since their respective sets of “all other
agents” diﬀer only with respect to each other, and this diﬀerence becomes insigniﬁcant
when the number of agents, N, is large.6 As N grows without bound, therefore, the
diﬀerences in expectations of any two agents become ever smaller and consequently, all
asymmetric equilibria converge to the unique symmetric equilibrium. This is stated below.
Theorem 3: Suppose i) ¯ tN ! ¯ t1 < 1 as N ! 1, where ¯ tN is the unique t such
that ut(N) = 0, ii) ˙ ut() exists and j˙ ut()j >  for some  > 0, for all t 2 (0;¯ t1) and all
 = 0;. For  larger than  described in Theorem 2, asymmetric equilibria of Γ may
exist, however they converge, if exist, to the unique symmetric equilibrium as the number
of agents tends to inﬁnity.
Proof: See Appendix.
5 We provide a two-agent example. Let ut() =   t be the utility functions for  = 0;1, and
consider a cdf function F such that F(0:2) = 1=6; F(0:4) = 3=8 and F(1) = 1=2. Clearly, ¯ t = 1 is
the cutoﬀ level when only one agent remains. Let t1 and t2 be the cutoﬀ levels of agents 1 and 2,
respectively, when  = 1 and neither of them adopted, i.e., in state s = 2. The condition for the agent
1 of t1 type to be indiﬀerent between adopting and not, is F(1)ut1(1) + (1  F(1))ut1(0) = F(t2)ut1(1),
or equivalently, ( 1
2  F(t2))(1  t1) = (1  1
2)t1. An analogous condition for agent 2 of t2 type is
( 1
2 F(t1))(1t2) = (1 1
2)t2. One can easily verify from F(0:2) = 1=6 and F(0:4) = 3=8 that these two
conditions are satisﬁed when t1 = 0:2 and t2 = 0:4 and when t1 = 0:4 and t2 = 0:2, hence asymmetric
cutoﬀ equilibria exist.
6 This is so even if the adoption process went a long way and only a small number of agents remain,
because “all other remaining agents” can be any subset of the initial set of agents with the right cardinality.
Here, we implicitly assume anonymity in the sense that each agent cannot tell other agents apart except
by their past adoption decisions.
134. Concluding Remarks
New products and services that have network externalities are often adopted by at
least some of the potential users of such products and services. A satisfactory model of the
adoption process should be able to account for the size of the group that chooses to enter
a network. A static model of network formation cannot do this because the existence of
complementarities implies that there are a multiplicity of equilibria. However, it is natural
to think of the formation of a network as a dynamic process in which each agent can
observe at each moment in time how many people have already entered the network and
can use this information to update his/her beliefs with respect to the expected number of
additional agents who will eventually join the network. Modelling the entry process as a
dynamic game of incomplete information is not only more realistic, but, as our analysis of
a simple dynamic market entry game shows, may yield a unique equilibrium. Unlike the
static network entry game, if individuals can choose when to enter then the decision of one
agent can inﬂuence the decisions of others. Therefore, the existence of complementarities
in the payoﬀ function of agents cannot, in general, support an equilibrium in which no one
enters because every agent believes that no one else will enter. Our model also has the
testable implication that the expected number of entrants is related to the properties of
the distribution of types in the population in a quite natural way. In particular, the model
implies that the more enthusiastic is the population about adopting the network (in the
sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance), the greater is the expected number of people
who will enter in equilibrium.
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Proof of Theorem 2: It is straightforward (hence, omitted) to extend the logic of
Lemma 1 to  suﬃciently close to 1 and verify that there is a threshold  < 1 such that in
any symmetric equilibrium of Γ with  > , every agent adopts with a positive probability
in period 1. Throughout this Appendix we consider  2 (;1). We now characterize
symmetric equilibrium (ai)i2I by an induction argument.
STEP A1: As argued above, the game reaches any possible state s = 0;;N +1, with a
strictly positive probability. It is trivial that if the game reached a state s = 1, i.e., only
one agent remains in some period k, then this last agent will adopt precisely when his type
does not exceed ¯ t deﬁned in (2). That is, the equilibrium strategy of the remaining agent
when he is the only remaining agent (i.e., in state s = 1) is a cutoﬀ strategy at 1  ¯ t.
STEP A2: Suppose that the game reached a state s = 2 in period k with a history hk.
Consider one remaining agent, say i, of type ti  1. If the other remaining agent, say j,
were to adopt in this period (which happens with probability p1, say), agent i would get a
stage utility of uti(N) forever by adopting in this period; if agent i waited in this period
he would adopt in the next period (because ti  1), hence again get a stage utility of
uti(N) forever but from next period onwards.
Next consider the contingency that agent j were to not adopt in this period, which
happens with probability p0 (= 1  p1). In this contingency, agent i would get a utility
u = 0 by not adopting in this period; if agent i adopted in this period, he would get
uti(N 1) this period, and from next period on he would get uti(N) in case agent j joins
next period (which happens with probability q, say, conditional on j does not join this
period) and uti(N  1) otherwise. Note that the agent j’s response in the next period is
independent of ti.
Combining the two contingencies, the beneﬁt of adopting this period as opposed to
waiting is
p1(1  )uti(N) + p0[uti(N  1) + q(uti(N)  uti(N  1))]
which is strictly decreasing in ti regardless of p1 and q, with a negative value at ti = 1.
Therefore, agent i (and j by symmetry) should employ a cutoﬀ strategy at a level, say
ˆ t < 1.
Let g() denote the posterior density function updated from f by hk on the type of
the remaining agent. Since p1 =
R ˆ t




ˆ t g(t)dt, the cutoﬀ level ˆ t
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Note that as  ! 1, i) the ﬁrst term of the LHS of (8) becomes negligible, and ii) the second
term is strictly decreasing in ˆ t (with the derivative bounded away from 0), clearly from a
positive value when ˆ t = 0 to a negative value when ˆ t = 1. Hence, for  suﬃciently close
to 1 there exists a unique value of ˆ t that solves (8), which is the equilibrium cutoﬀ level in
the period following the history hk, or equivalently, in the period with s = 2 and density g,
denoted by 2(gj). Furthermore, since the ﬁrst derivative of the LHS w.r.t. ˆ t when  = 1
is bounded away from 0 by a number independent of g (because this derivative is bounded
above by maxt ˙ ut(N  1)   < 0), for any  > 0 there exists  < 1 (independent of g)
such that if  >  then 2(gj) uniquely exists and j2(gj)  2(gj1)j < . Summarizing,
Lemma A2: For any  > 0, there is (2) < 1 such that if  > (2) then the
equilibrium strategy in state s = 2 with any density g is a cutoﬀ strategy at 2(gj), the
unique level of ˆ t that solves (8), and j2(gj)  2(gj1)j < .
STEP A3: Fix a state ˜ s and consider the following property in a symmetric equilibrium:
[A’] For any  > 0, there is (˜ s) < 1 such that if  > (˜ s) then the equilibrium strategy
in any state s < ˜ s with any density g is a unique cutoﬀ strategy at s(gj) and
js(gj)  s(gj1)j < .
Note that this property holds along an equilibrium when ˜ s = 3 by Lemma A2, and trivially
if ˜ s < 3. We now make an induction hypothesis that the property [A’] holds for all ˜ s  r
where r = 3;;N, along an equilibrium. Then, we establish that under this hypothesis
the property [A’] holds for ˜ s = r +1 as well. For this it suﬃces to show Lemma A3 below.
Lemma A3: Suppose [A’] holds for some ˜ s. Then, for any  > 0, there is 0
(˜ s) < 1
such that if  > 0
(˜ s) then the equilibrium strategy in state ˜ s with any density g is a
unique cutoﬀ strategy at ˜ s(gj) and j˜ s(gj)  ˜ s(gj1)j < .
16Proof: Fix  > 0. Consider an equilibrium of the subgame, Γ(˜ s;g), starting with a
state ˜ s and a density g. Let g0 denote the equilibrium density after the ﬁrst period of this
subgame. Note from Section 3 that when  = 1 the equilibrium cutoﬀ levels after the ﬁrst
period of this subgame only depends on the state, which we denote by s(g0j1) for s < ˜ s.
Also note that s(g0j1) < r(g0j1) if r < s < ˜ s and therefore, by supposition of Lemma A3,
the cutoﬀ level decreases in the state for  suﬃciently close to 1.
Consider a remaining agent i of type ti < ˜ s1(g0j) in the ﬁrst period of this subgame.
First, consider the contingency that at least one other agent adopts in this period. If  = 1
and the agent i did not adopt in this period, by adopting in the next period he can ensure
the same ﬁnal network size as the one that would have resulted if he adopted in the ﬁrst
period, by the same argument as the proof of Lemma 3. For  suﬃciently close to 1 so that
s(g00j) is arbitrarily close to s(g00j1) = s(g0j1)7 for all s < ˜ s and g00 that may arise in
future periods, the following holds: If the agent i did not adopt in this period, by adopting
in the next period he can ensure with arbitrarily large probability the same ﬁnal network
size as the one that would have resulted if he adopted in the ﬁrst period; and in this case
agent i’s utility diﬀerential when adopt now and when adopt in the next period (which he
will surely do because ti < ˜ s1(g0j)) vanishes as  ! 1. The utility diﬀerential for the
case that the ﬁnal network is not the same also vanishes as  ! 1 because the probability
vanishes that such a case gets realized.
Next consider the contingency that no other agent adopts in the ﬁrst period. In
this contingency, agent i would get a utility u = 0 by not adopting in this period. If
agent i adopted in this period, other agents would adopt in future periods according to the
equilibrium cutoﬀ levels. As  ! 1, agent i’s utility in this case is arbitrarily approximated
by the expected utility level of uti() calculated using the probabilities that  is the number
of other agents who eventually adopt. (Note these probabilities is independent of ti.) This
expected utility level is strictly decreasing in ti to a negative value at i = ˜ s1(g0j), and
the rate at which it decreases is bounded away from 0 independently of g0 (because the
rate each uti() decreases is bounded away from 0). Therefore, there is 00 < 1 such that
the expected beneﬁt of agent i of adopting in this period as opposed to waiting is strictly
decreasing in ti if  > 00 in any equilibrium of the subgame Γ(˜ s;g) for any g, hence the
equilibrium strategy in this period is a cutoﬀ strategy at a level ˜ s(gj) < ˜ s1(g0j).
Finally, let Euˆ t(gj) denote the expected beneﬁt of agent i of type ˆ t < ˜ s1(g0j) of
7 This equality follows because from next period on the cutoﬀ level depends only on the state when
 = 1, as shown in Section 3.
17adopting in this period as opposed to waiting when g is the density and ˆ t is the cutoﬀ level
in this period and s(g00j) is the cutoﬀ level of relevant future periods when the state is
s < ˜ s and g00 is the density. (s(g00j) is well-deﬁned by [A’].) As shown in Section 3 (in the
proof of Lemma 4), Euˆ t(gj1) is strictly decreasing in ˆ t due to 2 factors: i) uˆ t() strictly
decreases in ˆ t for each , and ii) the distribution of the ﬁnal number of future adopters in
case only agent i adopts in this period, deteriorates as ˆ t increases in the sense of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance. Since the factor ii) only reinforces the decrease, the rate at which
Euˆ t(gj1) decreases is bounded above by , hence bounded away from 0 independently
of g. Since Euˆ t(gj) is arbitrarily closely approximated by Euˆ t(gj1) as  ! 1, there is
000 < 1 such that if  < 000 then the solution value of ˆ t to Euˆ t(gj) = 0 is arbitrarily close
to the solution value of ˆ t to Euˆ t(gj1) = 0. Setting (˜ s) = minf00;000g proves Lemma A3.
Q.E.D.
Recall that Lemma A3 establishes the induction argument that if the property [A’]
holds for all ˜ s  r where r = 3;;N, then [A’] holds for ˜ s = r +1 as well. Applying this
result repeatedly, we conclude that [A’] holds for ˜ s = N +1, i.e., at the beginning of period
1, thereby establishing that there is a threshold  < 1 such that if  >  then there is
a unique symmetric equilibrium and this equilibrium converges to the unique equilibrium
characterized in Theorem 1 as  ! 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3: First we consider the case  = 1. The arguments that prove
Lemmas 3 and 4 do not rely on the equilibrium being symmetric. Therefore, it is straight-
forward (hence, details omitted) to extend these arguments to show that all equilibria are
cutoﬀ equilibria and that the claim of Lemma 3 holds for asymmetric equilibrium, too.
Consider any sequence of equilibria, (aiN)
N+1
i=1 ; N = 1;2;, where the superscript
N denotes the number of agents minus 1. (If asymmetric equilibrium does not exist for
some N, take the symmetric equilibrium.) Represent each equilibrium by the cutoﬀ levels
iN(hk) for each N, each i = 1;;N + 1, and each possible history hk. For each hk, let
N(hk) = minifiN(hk)g and ¯ N(hk) = maxifiN(hk)g. It suﬃces to show that for each
hk, the two sequences N(hk) and ¯ N(hk) converge to the same point as N ! 1.
To reach a contradiction, suppose to the contrary that they do not for some hk.
By taking subsequences if necessary, this amounts to supposing that N(hk) ! a and
¯ N(hk) ! b and a < b, owing to supposition i) of Theorem 3. Let ` be the last element
of hk, i.e., ` agents adopted in the last period of hk. Clearly, ¯ t`  a because a ¯ t`-type
agent would certainly join if ` other agents already adopted. Consider the agent with the
18cutoﬀ level ¯ N(hk). Recall that if this agent is the sole adopter in period k and he is
of ¯ N(hk)-type, his expected payoﬀ is 0. In this contingency (i.e., when he is the sole
adopter in period k), if the probability of additional adoption converges to 0 as N tends
to inﬁnity, then ¯ N(hk) would have to converge to ¯ t`. Since this would contradict a < b,
the probability of additional adoption converges to a positive number. Then, the expected
payoﬀ of this agent, say agent i, in this contingency is strictly decreasing in his type, and
the rate at which it does so is bounded away from 0 due to supposition ii). Consider
the expected payoﬀ of any other agent, say j, in the contingency that agent j is the sole
adopter in period k. For suﬃciently large N, the eﬀect of agent i in agent j’s expected
payoﬀ is negligible, and so is that of agent j in the corresponding expected payoﬀ of agent
i. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ schedule of agent j (as a function of t) is arbitrarily close
to that of agent i. Since the slope of the latter is bounded away from 0 as discussed above,
it follows that jN(hk), the type for which agent j’s expected payoﬀ is 0, converges to
¯ N(hk), that for agent i. Since agent j was chosen arbitrarily and ¯ N(hk) ! b as N ! 1,
we end up with a contradiction to N(hk) ! a < b.
For  2 (;1) we provide a proof based on an alternative argument. Note that if
one agent adopts in period 1, every other agent would have adopted by period 2 with a
probability at least F(¯ t1) > 0, hence the expected number of other adopters by period 2
increases with N. Since u0(1) > 0, this implies that every agent adopts in period 1 with
a probability that is bounded away from 0, say by  > 0, for large enough N. Then,
the expected number of adopters in period 1 increases without bound as N ! 1 and,
therefore, the ﬁrst period cutoﬀ level in any asymmetric equilibrium converges to ¯ t1. Since
the cutoﬀ levels of the symmetric equilibrium also converge to ¯ t1, it follows that the set
of types that would have adopted by any particular period in any asymmetric equilibrium
converges to that of the unique symmetric equilibrium as N ! 1. This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.
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